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Taxing E-Commerce in the Post-Wayfair World 
David Gamage, Darien Shanske, & Adam Thimmesch* 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in South Dakota v. Wayfair is 
perhaps the most important state and local tax decision in recent decades.1 
Since the 1990’s, internet-based electronic commerce (or, “e-commerce”) 
has exploded in both magnitude and importance.2 However, state 
governments have faced serious obstacles in their efforts to include e-
commerce transactions in the bases of their sales and use taxes. The 
primary source of these obstacles was the precedent from an earlier 
Supreme Court case decided in 1992 – Quill Corp. v. North Dakota.3 By 
overruling the Quill precedent, the Wayfair case has begun a new era for 
state taxation of e-commerce.        
The Court’s ruling in Wayfair was very narrow, holding only that the 
physical-presence precedent from Quill is no longer the governing 
standard for purposes of determining when a taxpayer has the “substantial 
nexus” required under the Court’s Complete Auto formulation.4 That 
limited holding leaves many questions unanswered.  
In this essay, we analyze many of the key questions that will arise from 
the Wayfair decision.5  As part of our analysis, we offer advice to state 
governments about how they should reform their sales and use tax regimes 
in response to the Wayfair decision.   
Specifically, we advise that state governments should consider: (1) 
simplifying their sales-and-use-tax systems, along with potentially joining 
 
*. David Gamage, Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law; Darien Shanske, 
Professor of Law, UC Davis School of Law; & Adam Thimmesch, Professor of Law, University of 
Nebraska College of Law. 
1. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018). 
2. David Gamage & Devin J. Heckman, A Better Way Forward for State Taxation of E-
Commerce, 92 B.U. L. REV. 483, 484 (2012). 
3. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 309-19 (1992). 
4. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099; Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).  
5. This essay is a revised, integrated, and elaborated version of pre-publication drafts of three prior 
essays. Those prior essays are: Darien Shanske, David Gamage & Adam Thimmesch, Wayfair: 
Marketplaces and Foreign Vendors, 90 STATE TAX NOTES 111 (2018); Adam Thimmesch, Darien 
Shanske & David Gamage, Wayfair: Sales Tax Formalism and Income Tax Nexus, 89 STATE TAX 
NOTES 975 (2018); Adam Thimmesch, Darien Shanske & David Gamage, Wayfair: Substantial Nexus 
and Undue Burden, 89 STATE TAX NOTES 447 (2018).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
GAMAGE ARTICLE  6/24/19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
72 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 58:71 
 
 
the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement (“SSUTA”) if they have 
not already done so, (2) offering full and adequate reimbursement for 
compliance costs, especially for smaller vendors, (3) offering free 
compliance software and immunity for vendors who properly rely on such 
software, (4) either ensuring that their sales-and-use-tax statutes impose 
substantive tax liabilities in the same manner as does South Dakota’s 
statute or else continuing their reliance on the historic formalism by 
requiring remote vendors to collect and remit use taxes rather than sales 
taxes, (5) ensuring that any attempts to expand corporate income tax nexus 
based on the Wayfair decision incorporate de minimis thresholds in a 
similar manner as with our recommendations for expanding sales-and-use 
tax nexus, (6) applying their new sales-and-use-tax nexus standards to the 
major marketplaces in addition to vendors selling directly, and (7) taking 
steps to alleviate possible concerns about in-state citizens shifting to 
purchasing from foreign vendors.  
 
I.  ANALYZING THE WAYFAIR DECISION 
 
It is helpful to begin by discussing the actual decision in Wayfair. The 
majority opinion was written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, who invited 
the case three years earlier in his concurring opinion in DMA v. Brohl.6 
Kennedy started the majority opinion with a review of the development of 
the Supreme Court’s dormant Commerce Clause doctrine since the 1800s 
and noted that the Court’s tax-specific precedents had been animated by its 
approach in its regulatory cases. The opinion started with a clear statement 
regarding the majority’s view of the merit of the physical presence rule, 
calling the rule “flawed on its own terms.”7 The opinion further stated that 
it was not a “necessary interpretation” of the substantial nexus 
requirement, that it created market distortions rather than preventing them, 
and that is was “the sort of arbitrary, formalistic [rule] that the Court’s 
modern Commerce Clause precedents disavow.”8 
The Court recognized that the nexus requirement was akin to the Due 
Process minimum contacts requirement and said that, although the two 
 
6. Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1134-35 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
7. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2092. 
8. Id.  
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“may not be identical or coterminous…there are significant parallels.”9 
Incorporating the Quill Court’s due process analysis by reference, 10 the 
Court then plainly stated that “[p]hysical presence is not necessary to 
create a substantial nexus.”11 With that, Quill was dead.  
The remainder of the Court’s opinion focused on justifying that 
decision. The Court discussed the distortionary impact of the physical 
presence rule, the Court’s general move away from formalism in its 
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the poor fit of a physical 
presence rule in the modern economy, that rule’s impact on states and our 
federal structure, and why stare decisis did not compel upholding Quill.  
The Court also addressed the concern that removing the physical 
presence rule would result in the imposition of undue compliance burdens 
on vendors engaging in interstate commerce, calling those burdens 
“legitimate concerns.”12 The Court did not feel that those concerns merited 
retaining the physical-presence rule, though, pointing to the availability of 
software and Congressional intervention “if it deems it necessary and fit to 
do so.”13 The Court also noted that South Dakota’s law provided a 
“reasonable degree of protection” for smaller vendors.14 The Court pointed 
to the law’s sales and transaction thresholds, its prospective application, 
and South Dakota’s membership in the SSUTA. It also referenced other 
potential avenues for smaller vendors to get relief from state laws that 
overreach using “other theories,” including the potential application of its 
Pike-balancing test15—something two of us have argued for in other fora.16   
The concluding section of the majority opinion gave some insight into 
the future of the nexus requirement, but not much. The Court seems to 
 
9. Id. at 2093. 
10. Id. (“Quill itself recognized that ‘[t]he requirements of due process are met irrespective of a 
corporation's lack of physical presence in the taxing State.’ (citing Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 
U.S. 298, 308 (1992)). 
11. Id.  
12. Id. at 2098. 
13. Id.  
14. Id.  
15. Id. at 2098-99. 
16. Adam B. Thimmesch, A Unifying Approach to Nexus Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 
116 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 101 (2018), http://michiganlawreview.org/a-unifying-approach-to-nexus-
under-the-dormant-commerce-clause/; Amicus Curiae Brief of Four United States Senators Supporting 
Petitioner, South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018) (No. 17-494), 2018 WL 1202848 
[hereinafter Brief of Four U.S. Senators].. 
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have offered a new standard for nexus—or at least a new formulation of 
the standard—stating that “nexus is established when the taxpayer [or 
collector] ‘avails itself of the substantial privilege of carrying on business’ 
in that jurisdiction.”17 The Court cited Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of 
Valdez,18 for that proposition. However, Polar Tankers involved a local 
personal property tax that was struck down as violating the Tonnage 
Clause and does not provide much guidance.19 This is especially because 
that case involved ships that were undeniably present in the taxing 
jurisdiction. Nexus would have been established even under Quill.20  
The Wayfair Court’s application of the nexus standard, whatever the 
formulation, was also terse and provided little additional guidance. The 
Court simply stated that “[h]ere, the nexus is clearly sufficient based on 
both the economic and virtual contacts respondents have with the State.”21 
The Court found that South Dakota’s economic thresholds ensured that 
impacted vendors had the requisite economic contacts, and it noted that 
respondents were “large, national companies that undoubtedly maintain an 
extensive virtual presence.”22 Those conclusions were enough for the 
majority to determine that the substantial nexus requirement was met on 
the facts presented.  
The Court then again took care to point out that “some other principle in 
the Court’s Commerce Clause doctrine might invalidate” the South Dakota 
law, but it declined to opine on that issue because it had “not been litigated 
or briefed.”23 The Court did, however, again note the fact that South 
Dakota’s law had “several features that appear designed to prevent 
discrimination against or undue burdens upon interstate commerce.”24 
Those features included (1) its de minimis safe harbor, (2) its 
prospectivity, and (3) South Dakota’s adoption of the SSUTA, which 
brings with it reduced administrative and compliance costs for vendors.25  
 
17. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099 (quoting Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 557 U.S. 1 (2009)). 
18. 557 U.S. 1 (2009).  
19. Id. at 6.  
20. Id. at 5.  
21. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099. 
22. Id.  
23. Id. 
24. Id.  
25. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol58/iss1/8
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Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion was joined by Justices Thomas, 
Ginsburg, Alito, and Gorsuch. Both Justices Thomas and Gorsuch also 
penned concurring opinions. Justice Thomas repeated his standard 
objection to the Court’s entire dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.26 
Justice Gorsuch was not far behind in his critique, but rather than casting 
doubt on the entire doctrine, he merely expressed reservation with it and 
noted that his broader concerns were “questions for another day.”27 
Chief Justice John Roberts wrote a dissent, with which Justices Breyer, 
Sotomayor, and Kagan joined.28 That opinion did not defend the physical 
presence rule—it indeed called the Court’s prior cases that had established 
that rule “wrongly decided”—but reasoned that any change to that rule 
should be done by Congress given the potentially immense economic 
consequences.29 The Chief Justice argued that the principle of stare decisis 
should have applied especially forcefully in the case and that the Court 
should have retained Quill on that basis. 30  
The majority opinion in Wayfair did one thing very clearly—it 
eliminated the physical presence rule as the relevant test for determining 
when a taxpayer (or tax collector) has a substantial nexus within the 
Complete Auto framework. Beyond that limited holding, the Court’s 
opinion did little else, which leaves a number of questions for states, 
vendors, and those interested in state tax policy. Two of the most 
immediate questions directly raised by the holding are: (1) what now 
constitutes substantial nexus, and (2) when now do state statutes unduly 
burden interstate commerce.   
 
A. What Constitutes Substantial Nexus? 
 
The first major question arising from the Wayfair decision, from both 
doctrinal and practical perspectives, is what nexus standard applies post-
Wayfair. The Court offered two threads from which to draw guidance. The 
first was its citation to Polar Tankers and its statement that nexus is 
 
26. Id. at 2100 (Thomas, J., Concurring). 
27. Id.  (Gorsuch, J., concurring).  
28. Id. at 2101 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
29. Id. at 2101–05. 
30. Id. at 2102. 
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created when one “avails [oneself] of the substantial privilege of carrying 
on business” in a jurisdiction. 31 That standard, though, could be construed 
as coterminous with the Due Process purposeful-availment standard and 
does not appear to require much beyond making sales to in-state 
customers.32  
The second hint of a nexus standard was the Court’s reference to 
“economic and virtual contacts.” Here is the key paragraph: 
Here, the nexus is clearly sufficient based on both the economic and 
virtual contacts respondents have with the State. The Act applies only to 
sellers that deliver more than $100,000 of goods or services into South 
Dakota or engage in 200 or more separate transactions for the delivery of 
goods and services into the State on an annual basis. S. B. 106, §1. This 
quantity of business could not have occurred unless the seller availed itself 
of the substantial privilege of carrying on business in South Dakota. And 
respondents are large, national companies that undoubtedly maintain an 
extensive virtual presence. Thus, the substantial nexus requirement of 
Complete Auto is satisfied in this case.33 
The first sentence of this paragraph suggests that two inquiries are 
relevant to nexus: (1) a taxpayer’s economic returns from a state and (2) 
its activities directed toward a state.34 The second and third sentences of 
this paragraph suggest that the South Dakota thresholds require sufficient 
“economic contacts” for substantial nexus. The fourth sentence, 
emphasizing the size of respondents, focused on the so-called “virtual 
contacts” that large, national e-commerce vendors create through their 
extensive marketing and web presences. 
 
31. Id. at 2099 (majority opinion) (quoting Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 557 U.S. 1, 11 
(2009)) 
32. WALTER HELLERSTEIN ET AL., STATE TAXATION ¶ 19.02[3][d][ii], Westlaw (database updated 
August 2018) (“by emphasizing the close affinity between Due Process Clause and Commerce Clause 
nexus standards, the Court effectively brought an end to the view, first introduced by Quill, that there 
are significant practical differences between the two”); Richard E. Kaye, Annotation, Internet Web site 
activities of nonresident person or corporation as conferring personal jurisdiction under long–arm 
statutes and due process clause, 81 A.L.R.5th 41 §5 (2000).  
33. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099. 
34. Evaluating nexus by reference to those two factors is similar to how state courts and legislatures 
have evaluated economic nexus for purposes of state corporate income taxes.  See Adam B. 
Thimmesch, The Illusory Promise of Economic Nexus, 13 FLA. TAX REV. 157, 176–84 (2012). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol58/iss1/8
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What this paragraph does not do is to address precisely when small 
sellers have a substantial nexus. What if a small seller has exactly 200 
sales, worth $20,000? Given this uncertainty, our advice for states as to 
nexus at the moment would be, at a minimum, to put in place thresholds 
similar to  South Dakota’s. As noted above, the South Dakota statute 
imposes tax collection obligations only on vendors who deliver more than 
$100,000 of goods or services into South Dakota or who engage in 200 or 
more transactions with South Dakota customers—both determined on an 
annual basis.35 Indeed, for states that want to be better insulated from 
challenges from small sellers, and likely at minimal revenue loss, we 
would suggest adopting higher thresholds (i.e., thresholds more deferential 
to small sellers) than South Dakota’s. This goes especially for non-SSUTA 
states. 
 
B. When Do State Statutes Unduly Burden Interstate Commerce? 
 
The Court’s opinion seems to leave more room for vendors to challenge 
state impositions as unduly burdening interstate commerce than for 
vendors to challenge whether they have nexus with a state. Such a 
challenge would presumably be evaluated based on Pike balancing. 
Several passages from the majority opinion imply this, although these 
passages are somewhat perplexing.  After all, Pike balancing has been 
previously understood as the backup test for economic regulations—not 
for taxes.36  
Pike involved a challenge to an Arizona statute regulating the labelling 
of cantaloupes shipped from the state.37 That statute was challenged as 
violating the dormant Commerce Clause because of the costs that it 
imposed on businesses that shipped products out of the state.38 In 
evaluating that claim, the Court stated that: 
 
35. See supra text accompanying note 33.  
36. See Mark L. Mosley, The Path Out of a Quagmire: A Better Standard for Assesssing State and 
Local Taxes Under the Negative Commerce Clause, 58 TAX LAW. 729, 739 (2005) (“The Court 
appears to have recognized that Pike balancing has no place in taxation cases because it has never 
explicitly applied Pike to such a case”).  
37. Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 138 (1970).  
38. Id. at 140.  
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Although the criteria for determining the validity of state statutes 
affecting interstate commerce have been variously stated, the general rule 
that emerges can be phrased as follows: where the statute regulates even-
handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on 
interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the 
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the 
putative local benefits.39  
The result of Pike is that the Court has generally applied a balancing test 
to non-discriminatory state regulations that impact interstate commerce. 
There is one notable exception, of course. The Court has evaluated state 
regulations that take the form of taxes or tax-collection obligations under 
Complete Auto instead. 
This is not to say that Pike and Complete Auto do not overlap. They do. 
The Quill Court even implicitly recognized that the nexus requirement 
serves a Pike-like function.40 The Court analyzed the physical-presence 
nexus rule in terms of undue burdens. The Court just expressly declined to 
require “case-by-case” balancing as is required under Pike and instead 
determined to protect against undue burdens by maintaining its “bright-
line rule.”41  
Given this history, Pike balancing and the substantial-nexus requirement 
have been understood as being different, and many of the amici who 
argued for Pike balancing did so specifically as an alternative to the 
Complete Auto framework.42 The Wayfair Court’s suggestion that both the 
nexus test of Complete Auto and the balancing test of Pike could apply 
was therefore something a bit new.   
In short, the Court could just have applied a balancing test in the context 
of substantial nexus.  Instead, the implication of the majority’s reasoning 
is that Pike balancing will be applied as an additional test. We do not 
know of a precedent for using Pike as an additional text on top of 
Complete Auto. In any event, the majority opinion clearly left open the 
possibility for a Pike balancing type of challenge. The opinion even 
 
39. Id. at 142.  
40. See Thimmesch, supra note 16, at 106–08.  
41. Quill, 504 U.S. at 314–15.  
42. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2102; Brief of Four US Senators, supra note 16, at 6, 13 (arguing that 
the “Complete Auto test [] is not the correct rubric” but Pike balancing is.). 
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(helpfully) explained the features of South Dakota’s law that, if duplicated 
by other states, would make those challenges less likely to succeed. Recall 
that the Court twice referred to the fact that (1) South Dakota thresholds 
provided a small seller safe harbor; (2) that South Dakota’s imposition 
applied prospectively only; and (3) that South Dakota was a SSUTA state 
and had thus simplified its system in ways to reduce compliance costs for 
vendors. States that can replicate those factors should take comfort that 
their statutes are permissible. States that fail them might need to be more 
concerned.  
Some discussions of the Wayfair decision seem to suggest that states 
must conform to these features of South Dakota’s statute before they can 
require remote vendors to collect tax.43 We think that reads far too much 
into the opinion. The Court certainly did not make these features into 
requirements. Instead, the Wayfair decision held that these features suffice 
to insulate states from judicial rebuke. Further, even in “non-conforming 
states,” it seems highly unlikely that a state statute would be overturned on 
Pike-balancing absent low thresholds or retroactive application.44  
Nevertheless, Pike is difficult to apply, and we think states should be wary 
of pressing the issue. Better to avoid costly litigation, especially when the 
revenue to be gained from smaller vendors is likely small.  
Therefore, as to Pike balancing, our advice is that non-SSUTA states 
should seek to reduce compliance costs for out of state vendors the best 
that they can. These states should find ways to simplify their sales-tax 
systems within local constraints, offer vendor reimbursement for 
compliance costs,45 and consider offering free compliance software and 
immunizing vendors who rely upon it.46 Again, we do not think that the 
Court’s opinion requires these actions, just that these actions would be 
legally advisable and are sensible in any event from a policy perspective.   
 
 
43. Joseph Bishop-Henchman, Post-Wayfair Options for States, TAX FOUNDATION (Aug. 29, 
2018), https://taxfoundation.org/post-wayfair-options-for-states/ (providing an analysis of whether 
states are “compliant” with the Wayfair “checklist”).  
44. We have previously written that retroactively imposed liabilities could potentially violate the 
dormant Commerce Clause. See Adam Thimmesch, Darien Shanske, & David Gamage, Wayfair and 
the Retroactivity of Constitutional Holdings, 88 STATE TAX NOTES 511 (2018).   
45. One of us discussed this first approach in a prior article. See Gamage & Heckman, supra note 2. 
46. Two of us discussed this approach in a prior essay: Andrew J. Haile, David Gamage, & Darien 
Shanske, A Potential Game Changer in E-Commerce Taxation, 67 STATE TAX NOTES 747 (2013). 
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II. DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE WAYFAIR DECISION 
 
Beyond the direct effect of replacing Quill’s physical-presence rule, the 
reasoning in the Wayfair decision may potentially impact doctrines related 
to the taxation of interstate e-commerce in at least a couple of other, 
potentially important, ways. Specifically, the decision’s reasoning may 
impact (1) the formalism that had previously governed interstate sales and 
use taxation, and (2) the doctrines related to governing nexus for state 
corporate income taxes.  
With regard to sales tax formalism, we advise state governments to 
either make sure that their statutes impose substantive tax liabilities in the 
same manner as does South Dakota’s statute or else continue to rely on the 
historic formalism by requiring remote vendors to collect and remit use 
taxes (rather than sales taxes).  With regard to income tax nexus, we 
advise state governments to make sure that any attempts to expand 
corporate income tax nexus based on the Wayfair decision incorporate de 
minimis thresholds (similar to those we recommend above in our 
discussion of expanding sales and use tax nexus). 
 
A. The Implications of Wayfair For Sales Tax Formalism 
 
The Wayfair Court’s reversal of Quill was consistent with the Court’s 
general trend away from formalism in its dormant Commerce Clause 
cases, and the Court partially justified its decision on that ground.47 But 
the physical-presence rule was not the only historic formalism implicated 
in Wayfair. Since the 1940s, the Court has prevented states from imposing 
their sales taxes on transactions that are completed out of state. 48 
Nevertheless, the Court allows states to impose economically equivalent 
“use taxes” on the in-state consumption of the purchased items.49 That 
additional tax could result in double taxation or discrimination against 
interstate commerce, but states have structured their sales and use tax 
systems to avoid those results. States both (1) set their use tax rates at or 
below their sales-tax rates to avoid any discrimination; and (2) provide 
 
47. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2094–95 (2018). 
48. McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944). 
49. Gen. Trading Co. v. Iowa, 322 U.S. 335 (1944). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol58/iss1/8
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their residents with credits against their use taxes for any sales taxes that 
they actually paid on the purchase of the taxable good or service. The 
latter ensures that residents pay tax at least equivalent to the tax that would 
be owed if they had made the purchase in state. The resulting system is 
economically equivalent to destination-sourcing the sales tax, but states 
must abide by this formal structure.   
The source of this formalism is the Court’s 1944 decision in McLeod v. 
Dilworth.50 That case involved a challenge to an Arkansas sales tax that 
applied to transactions consummated out of state but shipped to Arkansas 
customers. The Court struck down that sales tax as unconstitutional 
because the majority felt that allowing Arkansas to tax such a transaction 
would be to allow the state “to project its powers beyond its boundaries 
and to tax an interstate transaction,” which conflicted with prior 
conceptions of states’ powers.51 The Court did, however, recognize the 
broad equivalency of state sales and use taxes and it even upheld the 
imposition of the latter in a case that it decided on the same day.52 The 
Court reasoned that its different approach under the dormant Commerce 
Clause was justified because sales and use taxes were “different in 
conception” and “assessments upon different transactions.”53  
The Dilworth formalism has stood since the 1940s. Yet it is now unclear 
whether, and to what extent, this formalism still holds post-Wayfair. The 
South Dakota statute that was challenged in Wayfair conflicted with both 
Quill and Dilworth by requiring remote vendors to collect the state’s sales 
tax rather than its use tax.54 The litigation, however, focused only on the 
Quill precedent. Neither the parties nor the Court addressed the Dilworth 
issue.  
It is not clear to us whether the Court consciously avoided the issue or 
whether the Court just did not appreciate that aspect of the case. Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion did explicitly note that the South Dakota statute 
imposed a sales tax collection obligation, but the reference seems to have 
been more colloquial than technical. Read in its entirety, the Wayfair 
 
50. Dilworth, 322 U.S. at 327. 
51. Id. at 330. 
52. Gen. Trading Co., 322 U.S. at 335. 
53. Dilworth, 322 U.S. at 330.  
54. S. 106, 2016 Leg. Assemb., 91st Sess. (S.D. 2016). 
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opinion suggests that the Court viewed the difference in the taxes as a 
difference in who remits them—sales taxes being collected and remitted 
by vendors and use taxes being paid directly by consumers.55 That 
distinction is largely true, of course, but it is not the relevant substantive 
distinction between the two taxes. The Dilworth Court was right. The 
taxes are “different in conception” and “assessments upon different 
transactions.”56 
It may be that the Court was willing to ignore this issue because the 
parties did not raise it. The majority opinion did state that “[a]ll concede 
that taxing the sales in question here is lawful.”57 Perhaps that was the 
Court’s way of saying that the Dilworth issue had been waived, but it is 
not clear. The Court did remand the case to the South Dakota courts to 
resolve other, non-Quill, objections. The biggest issue flagged by the 
Court in that regard was whether South Dakota’s law would fail the 
balancing test of Pike v. Bruce Church, but it may be that the South 
Dakota statute remains vulnerable under Dilworth as well. The Court 
certainly did not explicitly overrule that case in Wayfair.  
The uncertainty involving this issue leads us to conclude that the better 
course for states would be to continue to abide by the Dilworth formalism 
and to enact their economic-nexus standards through their use-tax systems. 
It seems unlikely that the Court will clarify this area of law any time soon, 
if ever. Nevertheless, if states want to adopt sales-tax collection 
obligations using the South Dakota model, they will need to ensure that 
their statutes actually impose the tax as a substantive matter. South Dakota 
law appears to do so because it is a member of the SSUTA, which sources 
sales to where customers take delivery of property if they use a shipping 
company to pick up their orders.58 States that have adopted the SSUTA 
 
55. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2087 (2018). (“When a consumer purchases 
goods or services, the consumer’s State often imposes a sales tax. This case requires the Court to 
determine when an out-of-state seller can be required to collect and remit that tax.”); id. at 2088 
(“South Dakota has a sales tax. …Sellers are generally required to collect and remit this tax. If for 
some reason the sales tax is not remitted by the seller, then in-state consumers are separately 
responsible for paying a use tax at the same rate.”); see also id. (“Under this Court’s decisions in 
Bellas Hess and Quill, South Dakota may not require a business to collect its sales tax if the business 
lacks a physical presence in the State.”). 
56. Dilworth, 322 U.S. at 330. 
57. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2087. 
58. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 10-45-2, 10-45-108 (2010); S.D. ADMIN. R. § 64:06:01:62(1) (2015); 
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should therefore not have a problem with this issue, but other states might. 
If they are going to impose sales-tax collection obligations, they should 
ensure that their statutes operate similarly.  
Ultimately, this is an issue that is easy to plan around. States can follow 
the historic Dilworth formalism and require remote vendors to collect their 
use taxes. However, if states want to follow South Dakota’s lead, they 
should ensure that their statutes actually impose sales tax on out-of-state 
sales.  
Though we do not think the Court meant to overrule Dilworth by 
implication, this is an issue worth watching.  In our increasingly 
interconnected economy, we can imagine states having good reasons to tax 
(or regulate) transactions arguably entirely consummated out-of-state.59  If 
the formalism of Dilworth is no more, then the states might be able to tax 
such transactions. 
 
B. The Implications of Wayfair For Income Tax Nexus 
 
On July 13, Wells Fargo CFO John Shrewsberry announced that the 
company was making a $481 million adjustment to its earnings based on 
the Wayfair decision.60 That adjustment was not due to the company’s 
potential sales-tax exposure, but rather was because some of its affiliated 
entities had been relying on Quill to avoid paying income taxes in some 
states. That position does not appear to have been unique to Wells Fargo,61 
but it was aggressive. States and taxpayers have debated whether Quill 
applies to income taxes for some time, but state courts have nearly 
universally held that it does not.62 Wells Fargo apparently did not agree, 
 
STREAMLINED SALES AND USE TAX AGREEMENT §§ 310, 311 (STREAMLINED SALES TAX GOVERNING 
BD., INC. 2018).  
59. Ass’n for Accessible Meds. v. Frosh, 887 F.3d 664 (4th Cir. 2018) (striking down Maryland’s 
attempt to control certain drug prices because “it [] controls the price of transactions that occur wholly 
outside the state.”). 
60. See Andrea Muse, Wells Fargo Adjusts Income Tax Reserves Following Wayfair, TAX NOTES, 
July 17, 2018, https://www.taxnotes.com/editors-pick/wells-fargo-adjusts-income-tax-reserves-followi 
ng-wayfair. 
61. See id. (quoting one prominent accounting firm leader as saying that “the physical presence 
standard[] has long been thought to apply for determinations of substantial nexus for state income tax 
purposes...”). 
62. Thimmesch, supra note 34, at 173-75.   
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and technically the question was undecided because the Supreme Court 
had declined to opine on the issue. Wayfair left no doubt though. By 
reversing Quill, the Court settled this issue.   
What the Court did not settle is the same question that it left open with 
respect to sales taxes—how far can states go with nexus? As we discussed 
above,63 the Court referred to its Polar Tankers opinion in stating that 
“nexus is established when the taxpayer [or collector] ‘avails itself of the 
substantial privilege of carrying on business’ in that jurisdiction.”64 The 
Wayfair Court then analyzed respondents’ nexus by reference to their 
“economic and virtual contacts” with South Dakota.65 Unfortunately, the 
Court did not expand on what those terms meant or when they were 
sufficient for nexus. The Court merely stated that South Dakota’s 
threshold amounts—$100,000 in sales or 200 transactions—were 
sufficient to ensure that respondents had the required economic contacts 
and that respondents’ statuses as “large, national companies” meant that 
they “undoubtedly maintain an extensive virtual presence.”66  
The Court’s limited nexus analysis does not provide much direct 
guidance for states or taxpayers, but this is hardly surprising. The Court’s 
minimal approach was entirely consistent with how state courts had 
decided economic-nexus cases over the last two decades.67 It was also 
consistent with the Roberts Court’s general approach of crafting its 
decisions as narrowly as possible.68 Nevertheless, states and taxpayers can 
glean some guidance by looking at the origin of the physical-presence 
rule, the facts at issue in Wayfair, and the nature of the state income tax.  
First, we know that the Quill and National Bellas Hess Courts imposed 
the physical-presence rule largely due to the perceived compliance 
burdens associated with sales tax collections,69 and that those burdens are 
largely attributable to the large number of local jurisdictions with 
 
63. Gamage & Heckman, supra note  2.  
64. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099. 
65. Id. at 2099.  
66. Id. Earlier in the Court’s opinion, it discussed “virtual presences” in the context of “virtual 
showrooms,” presumably a website. Id. at 2095.   
67. See Thimmesch, supra note 34, at 173–81 (discussing how state courts have defined economic 
nexus). 
68. See Perry L. Moriearty, Implementing Proportionality, 50 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 961, 1031 
(2017) (commenting on judicial minimalism under the Roberts Court).  
69. See Gamage & Heckman, supra note  2, at 493–94.  
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consumption-tax authority and the differences in tax bases among 
jurisdictions. In addition, notwithstanding the continued existence of those 
compliance costs, the Wayfair Court found that South Dakota’s sales 
thresholds were high enough to satisfy the nexus requirement in a post-
Quill world.70 This means that $100,001 of sales or 200 transactions is 
enough of an economic connection to justify the compliance costs 
associated with use-tax collections.   
How does the compliance cost of state corporate income taxes compare?  
Certainly, there are far fewer jurisdictions that levy corporate income taxes 
and they generally resemble one another, including by piggybacking on 
the federal income tax for purposes of defining the tax base.71  Of course, 
the corporate income tax is likely a more complicated tax for many 
taxpayers for other reasons.72   We don’t have a strong opinion as to how 
this should come out except to note that states adopting factor nexus 
thresholds should be confident that their tests will withstand scrutiny as 
long as their thresholds do not dip unreasonably low relative to the 
thresholds in Wayfair. The $500,000 threshold contained in the Multistate 
Tax Commission’s model law seems safe.73 So does Michigan’s lower 
$350,000 threshold.74 It is not difficult to see that even lower thresholds 
could pass constitutional muster based on Wayfair.  
Not all states will want to adopt quantitative rules, and, notably, many 
 
70. Wayfair, 138 S.Ct. at 2099 (“Here, the nexus is clearly sufficient based on both the economic 
and virtual contacts respondents have with the State. The Act applies only to sellers that deliver more 
than $100,000 of goods or services into South Dakota or engage in 200 or more separate transactions 
for the delivery of goods and services into the State on an annual basis.”).  
71. HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 32, at ¶ 7.02 (“The outstanding characteristic of state corporate 
net income taxes is their broad conformity to the federal corporate income tax.”); see also id. at ¶ 
6.11[3] (asserting that “the burdens of complying with the income tax laws of various state and local 
jurisdictions are less daunting that the burden of complying with the laws of the nation’s 6,000 plus 
sales and use tax jurisdictions”).  
72. Compare Tax Comm’r of State v. MBNA America Bank, N.A., 640 S.E.2d 226, 233-34 (W. Va. 
2006) (majority justifying a less exacting nexus threshold for income taxes based on the lower 
compliance burdens associated with those taxes) with id. at 240 (Benjamin, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
corporate income taxes are more burdensome).  
73. MULTISTATE TAX COMMISSION, FACTOR PRESENCE NEXUS STANDARD FOR BUSINESS 
ACTIVITY TAX, Oct. 17, 2002, 
http://www.mtc.gov/uploadedFiles/Multistate_Tax_Commission/Uniformity/Unifo 
rmity_Projects/A_-_Z/FactorPresenceNexusStandardBusinessActTaxes.pdf. 
74. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 206.621(1) (2012). 
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states currently apply qualitative standards.75 Opining on the 
constitutionality of those standards is more difficult and those standards 
may be more susceptible to challenge than are bright-line rules if they do 
not provide protections for smaller businesses. We would therefore 
recommend that states with nexus standards adopt de minimis protections, 
at least administratively, if they want to avoid challenge. States should 
have little economic interest in pursuing taxpayers with very low in-state 
income in any event, so establishing minimum protections for taxpayers 
seems to be advisable in order to avoid costly litigation. De minimis rules 
can also serve to put taxpayers on notice as to what levels of sales will 
draw scrutiny and help to fight against taxpayer recalcitrance.  
Of course, nexus is not the only constraint on state corporate income 
taxes. States remain bound by P.L. 86-272, 76 and they apparently also 
must ensure that their statutes do not run afoul of the Court’s Pike v. Bruce 
Church balancing test.77  The constraints of P.L. 86-272 are familiar, 
however, and it is not likely that any corporate income tax we know of 
would fail Pike balancing. 78 
 
III. SALES TAX ADMINISTRATION IN THE  
POST-WAYFAIR WORLD 
 
Above, in Parts I and II, we analyzed questions that are in a sense 
directly raised by the reasoning of the Wayfair decision. However, in 
addition to those sorts of questions, another set of questions arises from 
contemplating how sales-and-use tax administration is likely to operate in 
the post-Wayfair world. 
 
75. See Thimmesch, supra note 34, at 181–84. 
76. P.L. 86-272 imposes a modified physical-presence rule for purposes of state income-tax 
assessments when a business is selling tangible personal property. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 381–84 (2012). It 
forbids the state imposition of income taxes on businesses who do no more than solicit sales of that 
property within its boundaries, but contains some additional protections when businesses use 
independent contractors in the state. See id.; see also HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 32, at ¶¶ 6.17–
19.  
77. See supra text Section I.B. 
78. Furthermore there is an argument that the broad concept of nexus in Wayfair will narrow the 
interpretation of “solicitation” in PL 86-272. See Jaye Calhoun & William J. Kollarik II, Implications 
of the Supreme Court’s Historic Decision in Wayfair, 89 STATE TAX NOTES 125, 136 (2018). 
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Most importantly, once states expand their sales-and-use-tax bases to 
encompass large out-of-state vendors, to what extent should state 
governments then be concerned about e-commerce transactions potentially 
shifting to either smaller out-of-state vendors selling through marketplaces 
or foreign vendors?  
In this Part, we argue that state governments should apply their new 
nexus standards to the major marketplaces. We also argue that states 
should feel free to adopt more encompassing nexus standards without 
fears that their residents will shift their purchasing to foreign vendors.  
 
 
 
A. The Problem of E-Commerce Marketplaces 
 
The Wayfair decision is already ushering in a new regime for interstate 
sales-and-use tax transactions wherein state governments should be able to 
successfully tax most transactions between in-state citizens and out-of-
state vendors.  However, for this new regime to be successful, it is 
absolutely critical for state governments to reach sales by small out-of-
state vendors conducted through the major marketplaces like Amazon and 
eBay. 
As we have discussed, there are limits to the extent to which the 
Wayfair decision allows state governments to impose collection 
obligations on out-of-state vendors.79  Importantly, the Court explained 
that it was upholding South Dakota’s law in part because that law 
provided a “reasonable degree of protection” for smaller vendors by 
exempting out-of-state vendors that deliver less than $100,000 of goods or 
services into the state or engage in less than 200 separate transactions for 
the delivery of goods or services into the State on an annual basis.80 
The major marketplaces (Amazon, eBay, Google, etc.) will certainly 
facilitate sales that, in the aggregate, exceed small-vendor thresholds of 
this sort.  But this raises the question of whether states can require these 
marketplaces to collect tax on transactions between in-state consumers and 
small out-of-state vendors that are themselves protected from having to 
 
79. See supra Part I.  
80 . Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2098. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
GAMAGE ARTICLE  6/24/19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
88 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 58:71 
 
 
collect that tax.  If not, then the result would be to create a substantial tax 
advantage for small out-of-state vendors selling via the major 
marketplaces as compared to their larger competitors.  Being that there are 
already a plethora of small vendors selling through these marketplaces, 
and there are many more small retail vendors that could easily set up 
operations to sell interstate through these marketplaces, this would likely 
create major gaps in the new interstate sales and use tax regime. 
Although the Wayfair decision does not specifically address 
marketplaces, we see nothing in that decision that should prevent state 
governments from imposing sales-and-use tax obligations on the major 
marketplaces.  We thus urge state governments to clearly apply their new 
nexus standards to the major marketplaces. 
Of course, states will have to carefully consider how they will define the 
marketplaces that are subject to these new requirements. Marketplaces 
come in many different forms. Some are run by companies that make sales 
themselves, like Amazon. Those companies already have tax-collection 
processes in place and are already subject to state tax-collection 
obligations. On the other end of the spectrum are marketplaces like 
Craigslist or Facebook Marketplace. Those marketplaces do not sell their 
own goods, do not facilitate payments, and generally cater to sellers who 
are making casual or isolated sales that are likely exempt from tax. 
Somewhere in the middle of the spectrum is a marketplace like eBay, 
which takes a very active role in facilitating sales and payments, has a 
well-developed website that guides consumers to particular goods and 
retailers, and is a platform often used for sales by businesses.  
States with marketplace facilitator laws on the books have thus far 
conditioned their tax-collection obligations on different factors. In 
Connecticut and Pennsylvania, for example, the marketplace facilitator has 
to participate, directly or indirectly, in the payment for the good.81 The 
statutes in Washington and Alabama look at a variety of other factors that 
involve the marketplace facilitator in the sale to some degree, including 
the provision of fulfillment services, price setting, branding, and return 
assistance, among others.82 
 
81. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § P.A. 18-152, § 4 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Feb. Reg Sess.); 72 
PA. CONS. STAT. § 7213(C) (2018).  
82. ALA. CODE § 40-23-199.2 (Westlaw through Act 2018-579); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
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We believe that states are well within their powers to require companies 
like Amazon to collect tax on sales that are made using its platform. States 
are also on firm footing if they want to require the collection of tax by 
vendors, like eBay, that take a very active role in promoting and 
facilitating sales, including by facilitating payments and returns and by 
providing money-back guarantees to those who use its platform. State 
power with respect to passive marketplaces like Facebook Marketplace or 
Craigslist is less certain, but it seems that states have less of an interest in 
pursuing those marketplaces given that many of the sales taking place on 
those platforms, though certainly not all, will likely be tax exempt under 
states’ casual or isolated sales exemptions.83 We suggest that states focus 
their efforts on the first two categories of marketplaces, but closely 
monitor the development and evolution of other types of marketplaces. 
 
B. The Problem Of Foreign E-Commerce Vendors 
 
There is broad consensus that the Wayfair decision about nexus also 
applies to remote sellers based in foreign countries.84  That is, assuming a 
state nexus statute passes the newish Wayfair regime, a non-US vendor 
must collect and remit the sales or use tax on the same terms as a US 
vendor.85 They have no special protection.   
To be sure, imposing a use tax obligation on foreign sellers implicates 
both the foreign Dormant Commerce Clause and the Import-Export 
Clause.86  Nevertheless, it seems hard to imagine that any state law that 
passes muster under Wayfair could offend either of these provisions. In 
either case, and painting in broad strokes, the state law would only likely 
 
82.13.010(3) (West 2017).  
83. HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 32, at 13.10[4] (noting that most states have sales-tax 
exemptions for “sales by those who are not regularly engaged in the business of selling”).  
84. William Hoke, Enforceability of Wayfair Decision on Foreign Companies Unclear, 89 STATE 
TAX NOTES 73 (2018); Deloitte, State Tax Implications of Wayfair for Non-US Companies with US 
Customers: External Multistate Tax Alert, DELOITTE, June 28, 2018, 
https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/p 
ages/tax/articles/state-tax-implications-wayfair-for-non-us-companies-with-us-customers.html. 
85. We refer to use taxes in the remainder of this essay, but it may be that states will impose their 
sales taxes on foreign sales instead. As we discussed above, this may be significant, and the foreign 
dimension may raise issues that have not yet been considered. See supra Section II.A (discussing 
whether states will impose sales tax obligations or use tax obligations post-Wayfair).   
86. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. 
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fail under these provisions if state collection efforts antagonized our 
trading partners in such a way that the federal government would take the 
side of foreign vendors in litigation, but without Congress actually passing 
a law preempting state collection efforts.87 
Commentators have wisely been much more concerned about whether 
and how states are going to get foreign vendors to collect use tax in the 
first place.88  The consensus seems to be that enforcement might turn out 
to be quite a problem, as a matter of both law and practice.89  If this 
consensus is correct, then there is a further empirical question of whether 
there the result will be an uneven playing field between domestic and 
foreign vendors. 
Let us start with the legal analysis.  It is likely correct that states are not 
going to have much luck getting foreign governments to enforce their use 
tax collection obligations under current law.90  Some analyses seem to 
imply that this is basically the end of the matter, but this is not so.  A state 
can surely impose a tax lien on any property that the non-collecting vendor 
has in the state, for instance.  For many states, such as New York with its 
banks and California with its ports, this will likely be a significant aid in 
enforcement.   
But what if the foreign vendor does not have property within the state?  
Again, the suggestion seems to be that if there is no property within the 
state, then the state is out of luck, but that too is incorrect.  If a state takes 
the trouble of getting its tax lien reduced to a judgment in its own courts 
and then follows the procedures of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments Act,91 then the state can enforce its judgments in the courts of 
 
87. As happened in Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979), but not 
Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983). See also Leanne M. Wilson, 
The Fate of the Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause After Garamendi and Crosby, 107 COLUM. L. 
REV. 746 (2007) (arguing that the key test involves a preemption analysis in light of non-tax cases 
decided after Container). 
88. See Hoke, supra note 84. See also Ryan Prete, Foreign Sellers Likely Safe from State Online 
Tax Frenzy Post-Wayfair, BLOOMBERG TAX, July 12, 2018.  
89. See, e.g., Garry G. Fujita, A Court Upholds Quill—What’s Next?, 86 STATE TAX NOTES 741 
(2017); William Hoke, supra note 84; Brian J. Kirkell & Mo Bell-Jacobs, E-Flight Risk? Wayfair and 
the Revenue Rule, 89 STATE TAX NOTES 551 (2018).  
90. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 483 (AM. LAW INST. 1987); Kirkell & 
Jacobs, supra note 89. This is not to say that governments could not and should not change this state of 
affairs. William S. Dodge, Breaking the Public Law Taboo, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 161 (2002). 
91. See generally C. Joseph Lennihan, Cross-Border Collection of State Tax Assessments: A 
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another state.92  Forms of this Act have been passed in forty-nine states.93  
In other words, Ohio can collect from a foreign vendor by enforcing its 
judgment against the funds it holds in a New York bank. 
To be sure, this process could be burdensome and apparently states do 
not typically go to this much trouble, but they sometimes do,94 and, in any 
event, they would have enormous incentive to do so if the feared shift to 
foreign vendors were to actually occur.  In short, we think that states will 
have considerable enforcement power if the feared shift to foreign vendors 
is significant enough to warrant such an effort. 
As an empirical matter, we don’t expect there to be a need for an 
enormous number of cross-state enforcement actions.  We say this for 
several reasons beyond our legal analysis as to state power.  First, as 
discussed previously, states almost certainly can and should impose 
collection obligations on major marketplaces like Amazon and eBay.95  
This should greatly reduce the scope for foreign vendors to sell to in-state 
customers while evading collection obligations.  Second, business-to-
business use-tax compliance rates are rather high,96 and so we are only 
concerned with direct sales to consumers.  Third, the shift of sales to 
smaller, foreign vendors does not present any unique enforcement problem 
for states given the legal and administrative need for small-seller 
exemptions.  It is just the case that it will always be difficult for states to 
 
Primer, 19 J. MULTISTATE TAX’N & INCENTIVES, Sept. 2009, at 8. 
92. The key Supreme Court decision establishing that states must enforce each other judgments 
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause is Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935).  
Note that this very case was about a county in Wisconsin attempting to enforce a tax judgment in 
Illinois. Id. at 269. 
93. See Lennihan supra note 91; see also Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, UNIFORM LAWS 
COMMISSION, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Enforcement%20of%20Foreign%20Judgme 
nts%20Act. (last visited Sept. 22, 2018).   
94. For instance, there are a number of cases involving New York trying to enforce judgments in 
Florida.  See, e.g., N. Y. State Comm'r of Taxation & Fin. v. Hayward, 902 So. 2d 309, 310 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2005). For an example of a local government successfully enforcing a judgment see City of 
Philadelphia v. Austin, 429 A.2d 568, 569 (N.J. 1981). For examples of businesses using the act to 
collect from other businesses see Sheldon H. Laskin, The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: A 
Government Service Designed to Benefit Nonresidents, 47 STATE TAX NOTES 41 (2008). 
95. See supra Part III.A. 
96. See, e.g., California State Board of Equalization, Revenue Estimate: Electronic Commerce and 
Mail Order Sales, Rev. 8/13 (2013) at 9 (“Through one means or another BOE believes that registered 
sales and use tax is paid on 90 percent of California taxable B-to-B electronic commerce”). 
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collect use tax on sales made by smaller vendors, regardless of where they 
are located.  
Fourth, the particular form of good arguably most susceptible to evasion 
– digital goods – does not strike us as relatively problematic for states.  
This is because, though growing in importance, digital goods are still only 
a small slice of the market.97  Also, many common business-to-consumer 
digital goods  are sold through major platforms that can clearly be targeted 
for enforcement; think of the Apple App Store, Google Play, Netflix or 
Amazon Prime video.  And if a foreign vendor attempted to operate 
independently of these platforms, it would still need to establish a payment 
mechanism to collect revenues from US customers.  Any sizeable foreign 
firm would likely want to access the US capital markets, creating another 
opportunity for states to collect. 
Fifth, though the potential price advantage from not collecting the use 
tax is real and substantial, we think that many of the commentators 
concerned about “e-flight” exaggerate the cost of use tax compliance in 
the same way that many remote vendors did pre-Wayfair.  Not only would 
the compliance costs for a foreign vendor with sales above the thresholds 
set by the states likely face a small cost relative to the value of its sales, 
but these compliance cost will not likely stand out relative to the 
compliance costs associated with other consumption taxes. 
For instance, consider a Canadian vendor.  At the national level, Canada 
has a credit-invoice Value Added Tax (VAT) that is, on its own, at least as 
complex as any state’s retail sales tax.98 If the Canadian vendor sells 
abroad it already must cope with Border Tax Adjustments (BTAs) because 
basically every other country on earth has a VAT, and BTAs are a 
standard part of VATs.  Once in the new jurisdiction, the foreign vendor 
will again need to deal with a VAT assuming it is making sales in the 
 
97. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, E-STATS 2016: MEASURING THE ELECTRONIC ECONOMY, May 24, 2018, 
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2018/econ/e16-estats.pdf (reporting 
that e-commerce was 8% of total sales in 2016). 
98. Likely more so.  See, e.g., Sebastian Eichfelder & François Vaillancourt, Tax compliance costs:  
A review of cost burdens and cost structures 28 (ARQUS, Working Paper No. 178, 2014) (“VAT 
seems to be significantly more costly than more simple sales taxes”), 
http://www.arqus.info/mobile/paper/arqu 
s_178.pdf. Note that many of the Canadian provinces also have their own consumption taxes. On the 
complicated system in Canada generally see Richard M. Bird & Pierre-Pascal Gendron, Sales Taxes in 
Canada: The GST-HST-QST-RST “System”, 63 TAX L. REV. 517 (2010). 
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foreign country itself.99 
Furthermore, and sixth, there is a significant body of literature to the 
effect that businesses generally want to comply with the law.  This is not 
just a matter of altruism, but good sense for the business and for the 
individual managers.100  Simply not paying a large state tax liability will 
show up on financial statements, for example, and will hover over any 
future plans to operate in the United States.101  It seems improbable to us 
that many large vendors are likely just to ignore the laws of states in which 
they make substantial sales.  Remember that in the pre-Wayfair world, big 
businesses like Wayfair were complying with current law when not 
remitting the use tax.  In the new post-Wayfair world, this will no longer 
be the case. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, if a shift to foreign sellers 
ultimately ends up being a large problem, despite all our reasons to think 
this will not be the case, then we would expect Congress to intervene on 
the side of the states.  After all, this would be a situation where all US 
domestic vendors would be at a disadvantage – we would not have the 
same issue as related to the Quill rule where the interests of different states 
diverged based on whether or not they had a sales tax. 
For all of these reasons, we do not expect that foreign sellers will create 
any major gaps in the new post-Wayfair sales-and-use-tax enforcement 
regime.  State governments should not let any fears about in-state citizens 
shifting to purchasing from foreign vendors stand in the way of efforts to 
apply more encompassing nexus standards for imposing collection 
obligations on out-of-state vendors.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this essay, we have analyzed a number of key questions that arise 
from the Wayfair decision. Certainly, other questions will arise beyond 
those we have considered here; we make no claims to having 
 
99. Foreign countries generally have de minimis rules that protect smaller vendors from VAT 
obligations, but the threshold amounts vary considerably. Emily Ann Satterthwaite, On the Threshold: 
Smallness and the Value Added Tax, 9 COLUM. TAX L.J. 177, 194–95 (2018). 
100. See Wei Cui, Taxation Without Information: The Institutional Foundations of Modern Tax 
Collection, 20 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 93 (2018). 
101. Kirkell and Jacobs make this point.  See Kirkell & Jacobs, supra note 87.   
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comprehensively analyzed all aspects of the decision. Instead, we 
conclude by repeating our list of the specific policy suggestions we offer, 
that state governments  should consider: (1) simplifying their sales-and-
use-tax systems, along with potentially joining the Streamlined Sales and 
Use Tax Agreement (“SSUTA”) if they have not already done so, (2) 
offering full and adequate reimbursement for compliance costs, especially 
for smaller vendors, (3) offering free compliance software and immunity 
for vendors who properly rely on such software, (4) either ensuring that 
their sales-and-use-tax statutes impose substantive tax liabilities in the 
same manner as does South Dakota’s statute or else continuing their 
reliance on the historic formalism by requiring remote vendors to collect 
and remit use taxes rather than sales taxes, (5) ensuring that any attempts 
to expand corporate income tax nexus based on the Wayfair decision 
incorporate de minimis thresholds in a similar manner as our 
recommendations for expanding sales-and-use tax nexus, (6) applying 
their new sales-and-use-tax nexus standards to the major marketplaces in 
addition to vendors selling directly, and (7) taking steps to alleviate 
possible concerns about in-state citizens shifting to purchasing from 
foreign vendors.  
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